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Paul Jacobson

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  • Something for law students: theory versus practice

    I just read a terrific post by Mirriam Seddiq, an American defence attorney, titled "The Law, a Love Affair of Sorts" about her love affair with the law and the difference between how law students experience legal practice and what it is like when you are actually at the front lines. It is the sort of post law students should read because law school rarely prepares students for what legal practice is like after they graduate. Seddiq writes from the perspective of a criminal defence attorney but her observations are relevant to virtually all areas of legal practice:

    But, here's the part in this post where I tell you what's different about being a real lawyer and what I wish I had known in law school. Because despite the fact that I was playing lawyer in law school, reality still hit like a ton of bricks. Ready for it? Here's what was different:

    The people. The responsibility for the people. Your clients. Their families. It is, sometimes, overwhelming. When you sign up for this, you sign up for a fight each and every day of your life, whatever side you are on. People, these people, they look to you. You are their soldier.

    Library International Law Reading Room, 1964My first experience with commercial legal practice as a candidate attorney was very much behind the scenes preparing documents, running around town delivering and picking up documents and attending meetings with my principal. It was quite a learning curve in those first two years and that learning curve hasn't flattened out yet after over a decade out of law school in law firms. What I find now is that I am still learning more about how to practice law, develop better relationships with clients (and sometimes how those relationships can be soured) and how to run a better law firm. Oh, there is also all that law which keeps changing, especially in my area of expertise.

    It is a stressful career choice and is not at all what I expected it would be when I was working my way through law school, dreaming about what it would be like to be an attorney out in the world. I probably wouldn't have been quite so arrogant straight out of law school if I had an inkling of what was coming.

    Like many lawyers I have often wondered what I did to deserve the stress and angst of this profession and spent many hours in my previous firm looking for a way out of the legal profession. Leaving to start my own firm changed my perspective on legal practice. What I learned as I built up my practice is that although we, as young lawyers, need to be exposed to a broad cross-section of legal work, the ugly and the exciting, we really begin to appreciate why we chose to go to law school when we find an area of work we are passionate about. Like any profession, finding the work you are passionate about makes all the tough stuff worthwhile and your work becomes less of a job and more a part of who you are. It is even possible to look forward to getting back to the office on Monday morning!

    2 months on
  • Something for law students: theory versus practice

    I just read a terrific post by Mirriam Seddiq, an American defence attorney, titled "The Law, a Love Affair of Sorts" about her love affair with the law and the difference between how law students experience legal practice and what it is like when you are actually at the front lines. It is the sort of post law students should read because law school rarely prepares students for what legal practice is like after they graduate. Seddiq writes from the perspective of a criminal defence attorney but her observations are relevant to virtually all areas of legal practice:

    But, here's the part in this post where I tell you what's different about being a real lawyer and what I wish I had known in law school. Because despite the fact that I was playing lawyer in law school, reality still hit like a ton of bricks. Ready for it? Here's what was different:

    The people. The responsibility for the people. Your clients. Their families. It is, sometimes, overwhelming. When you sign up for this, you sign up for a fight each and every day of your life, whatever side you are on. People, these people, they look to you. You are their soldier.

    Library International Law Reading Room, 1964My first experience with commercial legal practice as a candidate attorney was very much behind the scenes preparing documents, running around town delivering and picking up documents and attending meetings with my principal. It was quite a learning curve in those first two years and that learning curve hasn't flattened out yet after over a decade out of law school in law firms. What I find now is that I am still learning more about how to practice law, develop better relationships with clients (and sometimes how those relationships can be soured) and how to run a better law firm. Oh, there is also all that law which keeps changing, especially in my area of expertise.

    It is a stressful career choice and is not at all what I expected it would be when I was working my way through law school, dreaming about what it would be like to be an attorney out in the world. I probably wouldn't have been quite so arrogant straight out of law school if I had an inkling of what was coming.

    Like many lawyers I have often wondered what I did to deserve the stress and angst of this profession and spent many hours in my previous firm looking for a way out of the legal profession. Leaving to start my own firm changed my perspective on legal practice. What I learned as I built up my practice is that although we, as young lawyers, need to be exposed to a broad cross-section of legal work, the ugly and the exciting, we really begin to appreciate why we chose to go to law school when we find an area of work we are passionate about. Like any profession, finding the work you are passionate about makes all the tough stuff worthwhile and your work becomes less of a job and more a part of who you are. It is even possible to look forward to getting back to the office on Monday morning!

    2 months on
  • Google Street View: protecting your privacy

    Concerns about privacy have sparked a controversy in South Africa focused on Google Street View, a visual layer which Google recently added to its Google Maps offering in South Africa and which has been available in a number of other countries worldwide for some time now.

    One of the concerns about Google Street View was expressed by Managing Director of MUA Insurance, Christelle Fourie, who stated that Street View infringes on people's right to privacy. I don't necessarily agree with Fourie. Privacy and Google Street View is largely a question of when people have a legitimate expectation of privacy. If the Street View cameras only present imagery of views that are publicly available, there may not be a legitimate expectation of privacy and no invasion of privacy.

    As its name suggests, Google Street View gives you a view of addresses you can find in Google Maps from a street level.

    In the past, using Google Maps would give you the sort of map you see above (this is a map to our offices). You'll notice that in the map view below, there is a yellow man icon in the zoom controls.

    Google Maps and using Street View

    Dragging that yellow man to a location on the map will give you a street level view of that specific location. Once in Street View mode you can move around, zoom in and out and get a better view of whatever you are looking for. You may also discover that there is imagery presented in Street View that concerns you. It may be imagery of your home or just something that bothers you. Google gives you a way to report a problem or concern to Google. To do this, look for the link at the bottom of the image:

    Reporting a problem in Street View

    Clicking on that link will take you to a form you can complete to report your concerns to Google:

    Report a problem on Google Street View

    I have also prepared a quick video tour of Google Street View and a demonstration of how to report a problem to Google:

    2 months on
  • Google Street View: protecting your privacy

    Concerns about privacy have sparked a controversy in South Africa focused on Google Street View, a visual layer which Google recently added to its Google Maps offering in South Africa and which has been available in a number of other countries worldwide for some time now.

    One of the concerns about Google Street View was expressed by Managing Director of MUA Insurance, Christelle Fourie, who stated that Street View infringes on people's right to privacy. I don't necessarily agree with Fourie. Privacy and Google Street View is largely a question of when people have a legitimate expectation of privacy. If the Street View cameras only present imagery of views that are publicly available, there may not be a legitimate expectation of privacy and no invasion of privacy.

    As its name suggests, Google Street View gives you a view of addresses you can find in Google Maps from a street level.

    In the past, using Google Maps would give you the sort of map you see above (this is a map to our offices). You'll notice that in the map view below, there is a yellow man icon in the zoom controls.

    Google Maps and using Street View

    Dragging that yellow man to a location on the map will give you a street level view of that specific location. Once in Street View mode you can move around, zoom in and out and get a better view of whatever you are looking for. You may also discover that there is imagery presented in Street View that concerns you. It may be imagery of your home or just something that bothers you. Google gives you a way to report a problem or concern to Google. To do this, look for the link at the bottom of the image:

    Reporting a problem in Street View

    Clicking on that link will take you to a form you can complete to report your concerns to Google:

    Report a problem on Google Street View

    I have also prepared a quick video tour of Google Street View and a demonstration of how to report a problem to Google:

    2 months on
  • Ambush marketing 101

    It sometimes seems that one of FIFA™'s main pre-occupations during the World Cup™ is brand management and ambush marketing. I thought it might be helpful to explore this concept of "ambush marketing" and how it impacts on the World Cup™ in South Africa.

    There are a number of relevant and useful marketing resources which define the term “ambush marketing”. The following examples are particularly helpful in understanding this term:

    Wikipedia:

    Ambush marketing is a marketing campaign that takes place around an event but does not involve payment of a sponsorship fee to the event.[1] For most events of any significance, one brand will pay to become the exclusive and official sponsor of the event in a particular category or categories, and this exclusivity creates a problem for one or more other brands. Those other brands then find ways to promote themselves in connection with the same event, without paying the sponsorship fee and without breaking any laws.

    The UK Government/Intellectual Property Office:

    Ambush marketing generally occurs when one brand pays to sponsor a large-scale event (usually a sporting event) and a rival brand attempts to associate itself with the event. A marketing campaign takes place around the event but does not involve payment of a sponsorship fee to the event organiser.

    The most notable example of ambush marketing occurred at the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta, when a sportswear company avoided paying a multi-million dollar sponsorship fee, but successfully mounted a marketing campaign by plastering the city in billboards, handing out free banners to spectators and erecting an entertainment centre in its own name overlooking the stadium. Though this prompted large sporting organisations such as FIFA and the IOC (International Olympic Committee) to adopt anti-ambushing strategies, ambush marketing has become more and more widespread, possibly because for some companies it is the only way to compete.

    To protect official sponsors, event organisations can insist on certain criteria being fulfilled before a city or region are considered or awarded a major event.

    Brandchannel.com:

    Ambush Marketing Steals the Show Ambush marketing – a term often hissed in industry circles – occurs when one brand pays to become an official sponsor of an event (most often athletic) and another competing brand attempts to cleverly connect itself with the event, without paying the sponsorship fee and, more frustratingly, without breaking any laws. Ambush, or guerilla, marketing is as undeniably effective as it is damaging, attracting consumers at the expense of competitors, all the while undermining an event’s integrity and, most importantly, its ability to attract future sponsors.

    The common theme is that an organization attempts to take advantage of the publicity around an event by directly or indirectly associating itself with the event despite not being a paid sponsor of the event concerned. By doing so the organization seeks to secure a similar benefit to that obtained by paid sponsors without incurring the associated costs. Doing so can also negatively impact on the relevant event’s branding and the organizer’s ability to secure paid sponsors for future events. This would almost certainly have a financial impact on events’ feasibility as they are modeled.

    Ambush-protected vehicle

    Legislation

    The primary piece of legislation dealing with ambush marketing appears to be the Merchandise Act. The Merchandise Act’s purpose is:

    [t]o make provision concerning the marking of merchandise and of coverings in or with which merchandise is sold and the use of certain words and emblems in connection with business.

    The Merchandise Act deals with a number of mark and trade mark uses. The most pertinent section of the Merchandise Act is section 15A, is titled “Abuse of trade mark in relation to event” and provides as follows:

    15A. Abuse of trade mark in relation to event

    (1)

    (a) The Minister may, after investigation and proper consultation and subject to such conditions as may be appropriate in the circumstances, by notice in the Gazette designate an event as a protected event and in that notice stipulate the date-

    (i) with effect from which the protection commences; and

    (ii) on which the protection ends, which date may not be later than one month after the completion or termination of the event.

    (b) The Minister may not designate an event as a protected event unless the staging of the event is in the public interest and the Minister is satisfied that the organisers have created sufficient opportunities for small businesses and in particular those of the previously disadvantaged communities.

    (2) For the period during which an event is protected, no person may use a trade mark in relation to such event in a manner which is calculated to achieve publicity for that trade mark and thereby to derive special promotional benefit from the event, without the prior authority of the organiser of such event.

    (3) For the purposes of subsection (2), the use of a trade mark includes –

    (a) any visual representation of the trade mark upon or in relation to goods or in relation to the rendering of services;

    (b) any audible reproduction of the trade mark in relation to goods or the rendering of services; or

    (c) the use of the trade mark in promotional activities, which in any way, directly or indirectly, is intended to be brought into association with or to allude to an event.

    (4) Any person who contravenes subsection (2) shall be guilty of an offence.

    (5) For the purposes of this section 'trade mark' includes a mark.
    [S. 15A inserted by s. 2 of Act 61 of 2002.]

    The Merchandise Act defines a “trade mark” as a “trade mark as defined in section 2 (1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1993 (Act 194 of 1993), and includes a well-known trade mark contemplated in section 35 of that Act.” The Trade Marks Act, in turn, defines a “trade mark” as follows:

    other than a certification trade mark or a collective trade mark, means a mark used or proposed to be used by a person in relation to goods or services for the purpose of distinguishing the goods or services in relation to which the mark is used or proposed to be used from the same kind of goods or services connected in the course of trade with any other person

    The Trade Marks Act further defines a “mark” as follows:

    any sign capable of being represented graphically, including a device, name, signature, word, letter, numeral, shape, configuration, pattern, ornamentation, colour or container for goods or any combination of the aforementioned

    The Minister of Trade and Industry declared the event to be a “protected event” in terms of the Merchandise Act in General Notice 683 of 2006 from the date of the Notice’s publication in the Government Gazette until 6 calendar months after the event’s commencement. The Minister drew specific attention to section 15A and subsections 2, 3, 4 and 5 (quoted above). The purpose for this declaration was stated as follows:

    The "protected event" status is conferred on the World Cup on the understanding that the World Cup is in the public interest and that the Local Organising Committee (LOC) has created opportunities for South African businesses, in particular those from the previously disadvantaged communities.

    The apparent rationale is to safeguard the event’s anticipated economic benefits for South African businesses.

    FIFA™’s trade marks

    A document titled “2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa™ - FIFA™ Public Information Sheet (a guide to FIFAʼs Official Marks)” (“the guidelines”) list a number of FIFA™’s “Official Marks” or trade marks which it has registered in relation to the event. These trade marks include a number of graphical and textual trade marks. The textual trade marks include the following:

    • 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa;
    • 2010 FIFA World Cup;
    • FIFA World Cup;
    • World Cup;
    • 2010 South Africa
    • South Africa 2010 or SA 2010 or ZA 2010.

    The guidelines note that the trade marks listed do not constitute a “full list of FIFA™’s trademarks in relation to the 2010 FIFA World Cup™” and that a full list of FIFA’s trade marks may be obtained through an appropriate trade mark search.

    The guidelines also set out a number of examples of so-called “Unauthorised Association” with a FIFA™ trade mark. In the context of “informational editorial use” (the appropriate category given the report’s nature), the guidelines state that “any legitimate editorial use does NOT create an Unauthorised Association” with FIFA™’s trade marks. In contrast, the guidelines further state the following:

    “Infomercial/advertorial”: there is no legitimate justification for the commercial use or presentation of editorial content (“Infomercial” or “Advertorial”) by third parties using an Official Mark (such as emblems, words, slogans, event titles, etc.) as this creates an Unauthorised Association.

    Putting it all together

    So when it comes to ambush marketing in the context of the World Cup™ the central question is whether the brand being promoted is sanctioned by the event organiser, in this case FIFA™. If the brand being promoted is not sanctioned by the organiser, well that promotion is most likely a form of ambush marketing.

    This issue came up recently when Bavaria arranged for some ambush marketing of its own at the Netherlands vs Denmark game. According to The Daily Maverick:

    The two women were arrested on Wednesday for their part in Dutch brewer Bavaria’s ambush marketing stunt on Monday last week. At the Netherlands vs Denmark game, 36 women, initially dressed in Danish supporter gear, stripped down to orange minidresses, which featured a (miniscule) Bavaria logo.

    Nieuwpoort and Castelein were charged in terms of the SA Merchandise Marks Act. As Bavaria is not an official World Cup sponsor, it is not allowed to promote its brand in connection with the tournament.

    While the purpose of these measures is largely to discourage ambush marketing may be to protect significant investments in event-related marketing and branding, preventative measures like FIFA™'s heavy handed approaches have a Streisand Effect and only give the offending brand even more publicity.

    In the Bavaria case the Bavaria logo is barely noticeable from the photo in The Daily Maverick's article and while the extent of the unauthorised marketing shouldn't be an issue, per se, event organisers should carefully weigh their options when responding. Arresting some of the women involved in the Bavaria campaign highlighted the Bavaria brand and brought a disproportionate amount of attention to the case, as is evidenced by the 50 members of the press who were waiting at the Johannesburg Magistrates Court to cover the event. This was almost certainly not FIFA™'s intention.

    As The Daily Maverick's Kevin Bloom and Theresa Mallinson pointed out -

    Of course, the real winner in this scenario is Bavaria. The brewer has gained more marketing mileage from its initial ambush concept than it could’ve dreamed of – all due to Fifa’s inept handling of the incident. Talk about scoring an own goal.

    Update: Also be sure to read Chris Moerdyk's article on BizCommunity titled Kulula is outwitting FIFA at every turn for a perspective on Kulula's controversial campaign.


    Image credit: Ambush-protected vehicle by The U.S. Army licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 license

    2 months on
  • Ambush marketing 101

    It sometimes seems that one of FIFA™'s main pre-occupations during the World Cup™ is brand management and ambush marketing. I thought it might be helpful to explore this concept of "ambush marketing" and how it impacts on the World Cup™ in South Africa.

    Ambush Marketing at Netherlands v Denmark

    There are a number of relevant and useful marketing resources which define the term “ambush marketing”. The following examples are particularly helpful in understanding this term:

    Wikipedia:

    Ambush marketing is a marketing campaign that takes place around an event but does not involve payment of a sponsorship fee to the event.[1] For most events of any significance, one brand will pay to become the exclusive and official sponsor of the event in a particular category or categories, and this exclusivity creates a problem for one or more other brands. Those other brands then find ways to promote themselves in connection with the same event, without paying the sponsorship fee and without breaking any laws.

    The UK Government/Intellectual Property Office:

    Ambush marketing generally occurs when one brand pays to sponsor a large-scale event (usually a sporting event) and a rival brand attempts to associate itself with the event. A marketing campaign takes place around the event but does not involve payment of a sponsorship fee to the event organiser.

    The most notable example of ambush marketing occurred at the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta, when a sportswear company avoided paying a multi-million dollar sponsorship fee, but successfully mounted a marketing campaign by plastering the city in billboards, handing out free banners to spectators and erecting an entertainment centre in its own name overlooking the stadium. Though this prompted large sporting organisations such as FIFA and the IOC (International Olympic Committee) to adopt anti-ambushing strategies, ambush marketing has become more and more widespread, possibly because for some companies it is the only way to compete.

    To protect official sponsors, event organisations can insist on certain criteria being fulfilled before a city or region are considered or awarded a major event.

    Brandchannel.com:

    Ambush Marketing Steals the Show Ambush marketing – a term often hissed in industry circles – occurs when one brand pays to become an official sponsor of an event (most often athletic) and another competing brand attempts to cleverly connect itself with the event, without paying the sponsorship fee and, more frustratingly, without breaking any laws. Ambush, or guerilla, marketing is as undeniably effective as it is damaging, attracting consumers at the expense of competitors, all the while undermining an event’s integrity and, most importantly, its ability to attract future sponsors.

    The common theme is that an organization attempts to take advantage of the publicity around an event by directly or indirectly associating itself with the event despite not being a paid sponsor of the event concerned. By doing so the organization seeks to secure a similar benefit to that obtained by paid sponsors without incurring the associated costs. Doing so can also negatively impact on the relevant event’s branding and the organizer’s ability to secure paid sponsors for future events. This would almost certainly have a financial impact on events’ feasibility as they are modeled.

    Ambush-protected vehicle

    Legislation

    The primary piece of legislation dealing with ambush marketing appears to be the Merchandise Act. The Merchandise Act’s purpose is:

    [t]o make provision concerning the marking of merchandise and of coverings in or with which merchandise is sold and the use of certain words and emblems in connection with business.

    The Merchandise Act deals with a number of mark and trade mark uses. The most pertinent section of the Merchandise Act is section 15A, is titled “Abuse of trade mark in relation to event” and provides as follows:

    15A. Abuse of trade mark in relation to event

    (1)

    (a) The Minister may, after investigation and proper consultation and subject to such conditions as may be appropriate in the circumstances, by notice in the Gazette designate an event as a protected event and in that notice stipulate the date-

    (i) with effect from which the protection commences; and

    (ii) on which the protection ends, which date may not be later than one month after the completion or termination of the event.

    (b) The Minister may not designate an event as a protected event unless the staging of the event is in the public interest and the Minister is satisfied that the organisers have created sufficient opportunities for small businesses and in particular those of the previously disadvantaged communities.

    (2) For the period during which an event is protected, no person may use a trade mark in relation to such event in a manner which is calculated to achieve publicity for that trade mark and thereby to derive special promotional benefit from the event, without the prior authority of the organiser of such event.

    (3) For the purposes of subsection (2), the use of a trade mark includes –

    (a) any visual representation of the trade mark upon or in relation to goods or in relation to the rendering of services;

    (b) any audible reproduction of the trade mark in relation to goods or the rendering of services; or

    (c) the use of the trade mark in promotional activities, which in any way, directly or indirectly, is intended to be brought into association with or to allude to an event.

    (4) Any person who contravenes subsection (2) shall be guilty of an offence.

    (5) For the purposes of this section 'trade mark' includes a mark.
    [S. 15A inserted by s. 2 of Act 61 of 2002.]

    The Merchandise Act defines a “trade mark” as a “trade mark as defined in section 2 (1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1993 (Act 194 of 1993), and includes a well-known trade mark contemplated in section 35 of that Act.” The Trade Marks Act, in turn, defines a “trade mark” as follows:

    other than a certification trade mark or a collective trade mark, means a mark used or proposed to be used by a person in relation to goods or services for the purpose of distinguishing the goods or services in relation to which the mark is used or proposed to be used from the same kind of goods or services connected in the course of trade with any other person

    The Trade Marks Act further defines a “mark” as follows:

    any sign capable of being represented graphically, including a device, name, signature, word, letter, numeral, shape, configuration, pattern, ornamentation, colour or container for goods or any combination of the aforementioned

    The Minister of Trade and Industry declared the event to be a “protected event” in terms of the Merchandise Act in General Notice 683 of 2006 from the date of the Notice’s publication in the Government Gazette until 6 calendar months after the event’s commencement. The Minister drew specific attention to section 15A and subsections 2, 3, 4 and 5 (quoted above). The purpose for this declaration was stated as follows:

    The "protected event" status is conferred on the World Cup on the understanding that the World Cup is in the public interest and that the Local Organising Committee (LOC) has created opportunities for South African businesses, in particular those from the previously disadvantaged communities.

    The apparent rationale is to safeguard the event’s anticipated economic benefits for South African businesses.

    FIFA™’s trade marks

    A document titled “2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa™ - FIFA™ Public Information Sheet (a guide to FIFAʼs Official Marks)” (“the guidelines”) list a number of FIFA™’s “Official Marks” or trade marks which it has registered in relation to the event. These trade marks include a number of graphical and textual trade marks. The textual trade marks include the following:

    • 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa;
    • 2010 FIFA World Cup;
    • FIFA World Cup;
    • World Cup;
    • 2010 South Africa
    • South Africa 2010 or SA 2010 or ZA 2010.

    The guidelines note that the trade marks listed do not constitute a “full list of FIFA™’s trademarks in relation to the 2010 FIFA World Cup™” and that a full list of FIFA’s trade marks may be obtained through an appropriate trade mark search.

    The guidelines also set out a number of examples of so-called “Unauthorised Association” with a FIFA™ trade mark. In the context of “informational editorial use” (the appropriate category given the report’s nature), the guidelines state that “any legitimate editorial use does NOT create an Unauthorised Association” with FIFA™’s trade marks. In contrast, the guidelines further state the following:

    “Infomercial/advertorial”: there is no legitimate justification for the commercial use or presentation of editorial content (“Infomercial” or “Advertorial”) by third parties using an Official Mark (such as emblems, words, slogans, event titles, etc.) as this creates an Unauthorised Association.

    Putting it all together

    So when it comes to ambush marketing in the context of the World Cup™ the central question is whether the brand being promoted is sanctioned by the event organiser, in this case FIFA™. If the brand being promoted is not sanctioned by the organiser, well that promotion is most likely a form of ambush marketing.

    This issue came up recently when Bavaria arranged for some ambush marketing of its own at the Netherlands vs Denmark game. According to The Daily Maverick:

    The two women were arrested on Wednesday for their part in Dutch brewer Bavaria’s ambush marketing stunt on Monday last week. At the Netherlands vs Denmark game, 36 women, initially dressed in Danish supporter gear, stripped down to orange minidresses, which featured a (miniscule) Bavaria logo.

    Nieuwpoort and Castelein were charged in terms of the SA Merchandise Marks Act. As Bavaria is not an official World Cup sponsor, it is not allowed to promote its brand in connection with the tournament.

    While the purpose of these measures is largely to discourage ambush marketing may be to protect significant investments in event-related marketing and branding, preventative measures like FIFA™'s heavy handed approaches have a Streisand Effect and only give the offending brand even more publicity.

    In the Bavaria case the Bavaria logo is barely noticeable from the photo in The Daily Maverick's article and while the extent of the unauthorised marketing shouldn't be an issue, per se, event organisers should carefully weigh their options when responding. Arresting some of the women involved in the Bavaria campaign highlighted the Bavaria brand and brought a disproportionate amount of attention to the case, as is evidenced by the 50 members of the press who were waiting at the Johannesburg Magistrates Court to cover the event. This was almost certainly not FIFA™'s intention.

    As The Daily Maverick's Kevin Bloom and Theresa Mallinson pointed out -

    Of course, the real winner in this scenario is Bavaria. The brewer has gained more marketing mileage from its initial ambush concept than it could’ve dreamed of – all due to Fifa’s inept handling of the incident. Talk about scoring an own goal.

    Update: Also be sure to read Chris Moerdyk's article on BizCommunity titled Kulula is outwitting FIFA at every turn for a perspective on Kulula's controversial campaign.


    Image credits:

    2 months on
  • RSS does not mean Reuse Share Sell: taking the Pulse of noncommercial

    feed-icon-96x96.pngThe Pulse RSS reader caused quite a stir when Steve Jobs demonstrated it during his recent WWDC keynote speech. He talked briefly about Pulse's merits and as used it as an example of the sorts of applications which are available for the iPad in the iTunes App Store. He probably didn't count on the New York Times' lawyers taking issue with the Times' feed being one of the feeds Pulse ships with by default, particularly considering that Pulse is a paid application. NYT's lawyers wrote to Apple requesting that Pulse be pulled from the App Store alleging as follows:

    The Pulse News Reader app, makes commercial use of the NYTimes.com and Boston.com RSS feeds, in violation of their Terms of Use*. Thus, the use of our content is unlicensed. The app also frames the NYTimes.com and Boston.com websites in violation of their respective Terms of Use.

    I note that the app is delivered with the NYTimes.com RSS feed preloaded, which is prominently featured in the screen shots used to sell the app on iTunes.

    The full email was republished on Kara Swisher's blog. The NYT's terms of service provide as follows:

    2. NYTIMES.COM CONTENT

    2.1 The contents of the NYTimes.com sites are intended for your personal, noncommercial use. All materials published on NYTimes.com (including, but not limited to news articles, photographs, images, illustrations, audio clips and video clips, also known as the "Content") are protected by copyright, and owned or controlled by The New York Times Company, NYTimes.com, or the party credited as the provider of the Content. You shall abide by all additional copyright notices, information, or restrictions contained in any Content accessed through the Service.

    2.2 The Service and its Contents are protected by copyright pursuant to U.S. and international copyright laws. You may not modify, publish, transmit, participate in the transfer or sale of, reproduce (except as provided in Section 2.3 of these Terms of Service), create new works from, distribute, perform, display, or in any way exploit, any of the Content or the Service (including software) in whole or in part.

    2.3 You may download or copy the Content and other downloadable items displayed on the Service for personal use only, provided that you maintain all copyright and other notices contained therein. Copying or storing of any Content for other than personal use is expressly prohibited without prior written permission from The New York Times Rights and Permissions Department, or the copyright holder identified in the copyright notice contained in the Content.

    The terms of service clearly restrict use of NYT content to "personal, noncommercial" use and, as the extract from NYT's lawyer above indicates, NYT was of the view that including the NYT's feed in the Pulse application was a commercial use of that content, apparently because the NYT believes its content was used to sell Pulse. NYT also objected to Pulse "framing" NYT and Boston Globe content in the application, presumably a reference to how these websites can be displayed in Pulse like a Web browser. In fact, Pulse incorporates a Web browser to display actual Web pages rather than just the published RSS or Atom feeds.

    I have been listening to the debate on a recent episode of This Week in Law about the merits of NYT's lawyer's contention that Pulse infringed NYT's terms of service and made use of NYT's and its affiliate's content for uses that were not personal and noncommercial. Evan Brown expressed a view early on in the podcast that seemed to mirror the view held by NYT's lawyer; namely that the terms of service prohibit commercial use of NYT's content and Pulse's use of the content was commercial, therefore a violation of the content license the NYT grants to its readers. This, in turn, justified NYT's call for the application to be pulled. I initially agreed with his view and disagreed with TWIL host Denise Howell's arguments that aggregators like Pulse should be regarded as utilities and effectively exempt from any argument that they infringe copyright simply because they display content feeds that the content owner publishes (I believe that summarizes her argument fairly).

    I do see Denise's point and agree that regarding a paid RSS reader as infringing copyright because it displays a feed which may have a noncommercial restriction is as absurd as claiming Google; Mozilla; Apple, Opera or any Web browser developer is liable for copyright infringement because their browsers display content with similar restrictions. On the other hand, I don't believe that this is what the real issue is. The real issue in this case is whether a paid RSS reader like Pulse is making commercial use of content either by displaying it at all or if it displays the restricted content in its marketing material? The term "noncommercial" has proven to be a particularly tough one to pin down, so much so that Creative Commons commissioned a study on what people generally understand by this term.

    On the one hand, Pulse is a paid application and a user's purchasing decision may be influenced by the appearance of the NYT's content in the application when it is demonstrated. What if the NYT's content was not included in the application's demonstrations? What if a user purchased the application and subsequently added the NYT's feed to Pulse and consumed that content on a personal and noncommercial basis? Would this use still be tainted by the price charged to use Pulse? NYT's lawyers would seem to argue this is the case but this argument is increasingly absurd when you consider that the argument necessarily means that Google, Mozilla, Apple and Co. must similarly be on the hook for copyright infringement if people view the NYT website in their browsers.

    The central question should be whether the use of the content is permitted by the relevant content provider's terms of service or content license and not whether the technology used to access that content permits that access, as I understand Howell's argument to suggest, in part. Assuming I understood this to be one of Howell's points correctly, the logical implication of her further argument is that it should be legal to pirate and share pirated content because the means exist to make this possible. Rather, the argument should focus on the relevant content license which may have been applied to the content (or, in the absence of a license, the restrictions of copyright law itself).

    I see selling content as a clear case of commercial use. On the other hand, enabling a person to view content in a freely available Web browser shouldn't be regarded as commercial use of the content. The fact that Pulse is a paid application shouldn't, in itself, make displaying the NYT's content (either the website itself or its published feeds) commercial but perhaps selling the application with an implication of NYT's endorsement or, worse, that NYT content is part of the deal could be commercial use of NYT's content. The answer to this question isn't clear but the closer Pulse's developer gets to actually making profit from NYT's content directly, the clearer it is that his use of NYT's content is commercial. The developer is probably best served removing NYT content from the application as it ships and to refrain from referring to it or displaying it in the application in his marketing material.

    What this furore highlights, though, is that some publishers publish their content under restrictive content licenses which are typically detailed in their terms and conditions. I have advised a couple clients who has assumed that if content is published through a feed they should be free to use that content however they please but this is simply not the case. Irrespective of the technology used to publish the content, content licenses still apply to that content and use of the content should be moderated accordingly.

    2 months on
  • RSS does not mean Reuse Share Sell: taking the Pulse of noncommercial

    feed-icon-96x96.pngThe Pulse RSS reader caused quite a stir when Steve Jobs demonstrated it during his recent WWDC keynote speech. He talked briefly about Pulse's merits and as used it as an example of the sorts of applications which are available for the iPad in the iTunes App Store. He probably didn't count on the New York Times' lawyers taking issue with the Times' feed being one of the feeds Pulse ships with by default, particularly considering that Pulse is a paid application. NYT's lawyers wrote to Apple requesting that Pulse be pulled from the App Store alleging as follows:

    The Pulse News Reader app, makes commercial use of the NYTimes.com and Boston.com RSS feeds, in violation of their Terms of Use*. Thus, the use of our content is unlicensed. The app also frames the NYTimes.com and Boston.com websites in violation of their respective Terms of Use.

    I note that the app is delivered with the NYTimes.com RSS feed preloaded, which is prominently featured in the screen shots used to sell the app on iTunes.

    The full email was republished on Kara Swisher's blog. The NYT's terms of service provide as follows:

    2. NYTIMES.COM CONTENT

    2.1 The contents of the NYTimes.com sites are intended for your personal, noncommercial use. All materials published on NYTimes.com (including, but not limited to news articles, photographs, images, illustrations, audio clips and video clips, also known as the "Content") are protected by copyright, and owned or controlled by The New York Times Company, NYTimes.com, or the party credited as the provider of the Content. You shall abide by all additional copyright notices, information, or restrictions contained in any Content accessed through the Service.

    2.2 The Service and its Contents are protected by copyright pursuant to U.S. and international copyright laws. You may not modify, publish, transmit, participate in the transfer or sale of, reproduce (except as provided in Section 2.3 of these Terms of Service), create new works from, distribute, perform, display, or in any way exploit, any of the Content or the Service (including software) in whole or in part.

    2.3 You may download or copy the Content and other downloadable items displayed on the Service for personal use only, provided that you maintain all copyright and other notices contained therein. Copying or storing of any Content for other than personal use is expressly prohibited without prior written permission from The New York Times Rights and Permissions Department, or the copyright holder identified in the copyright notice contained in the Content.

    The terms of service clearly restrict use of NYT content to "personal, noncommercial" use and, as the extract from NYT's lawyer above indicates, NYT was of the view that including the NYT's feed in the Pulse application was a commercial use of that content, apparently because the NYT believes its content was used to sell Pulse. NYT also objected to Pulse "framing" NYT and Boston Globe content in the application, presumably a reference to how these websites can be displayed in Pulse like a Web browser. In fact, Pulse incorporates a Web browser to display actual Web pages rather than just the published RSS or Atom feeds.

    I have been listening to the debate on a recent episode of This Week in Law about the merits of NYT's lawyer's contention that Pulse infringed NYT's terms of service and made use of NYT's and its affiliate's content for uses that were not personal and noncommercial. Evan Brown expressed a view early on in the podcast that seemed to mirror the view held by NYT's lawyer; namely that the terms of service prohibit commercial use of NYT's content and Pulse's use of the content was commercial, therefore a violation of the content license the NYT grants to its readers. This, in turn, justified NYT's call for the application to be pulled. I initially agreed with his view and disagreed with TWIL host Denise Howell's arguments that aggregators like Pulse should be regarded as utilities and effectively exempt from any argument that they infringe copyright simply because they display content feeds that the content owner publishes (I believe that summarizes her argument fairly).

    I do see Denise's point and agree that regarding a paid RSS reader as infringing copyright because it displays a feed which may have a noncommercial restriction is as absurd as claiming Google; Mozilla; Apple, Opera or any Web browser developer is liable for copyright infringement because their browsers display content with similar restrictions. On the other hand, I don't believe that this is what the real issue is. The real issue in this case is whether a paid RSS reader like Pulse is making commercial use of content either by displaying it at all or if it displays the restricted content in its marketing material? The term "noncommercial" has proven to be a particularly tough one to pin down, so much so that Creative Commons commissioned a study on what people generally understand by this term.

    On the one hand, Pulse is a paid application and a user's purchasing decision may be influenced by the appearance of the NYT's content in the application when it is demonstrated. What if the NYT's content was not included in the application's demonstrations? What if a user purchased the application and subsequently added the NYT's feed to Pulse and consumed that content on a personal and noncommercial basis? Would this use still be tainted by the price charged to use Pulse? NYT's lawyers would seem to argue this is the case but this argument is increasingly absurd when you consider that the argument necessarily means that Google, Mozilla, Apple and Co. must similarly be on the hook for copyright infringement if people view the NYT website in their browsers.

    The central question should be whether the use of the content is permitted by the relevant content provider's terms of service or content license and not whether the technology used to access that content permits that access, as I understand Howell's argument to suggest, in part. Assuming I understood this to be one of Howell's points correctly, the logical implication of her further argument is that it should be legal to pirate and share pirated content because the means exist to make this possible. Rather, the argument should focus on the relevant content license which may have been applied to the content (or, in the absence of a license, the restrictions of copyright law itself).

    I see selling content as a clear case of commercial use. On the other hand, enabling a person to view content in a freely available Web browser shouldn't be regarded as commercial use of the content. The fact that Pulse is a paid application shouldn't, in itself, make displaying the NYT's content (either the website itself or its published feeds) commercial but perhaps selling the application with an implication of NYT's endorsement or, worse, that NYT content is part of the deal could be commercial use of NYT's content. The answer to this question isn't clear but the closer Pulse's developer gets to actually making profit from NYT's content directly, the clearer it is that his use of NYT's content is commercial. The developer is probably best served removing NYT content from the application as it ships and to refrain from referring to it or displaying it in the application in his marketing material.

    What this furore highlights, though, is that some publishers publish their content under restrictive content licenses which are typically detailed in their terms and conditions. I have advised a couple clients who has assumed that if content is published through a feed they should be free to use that content however they please but this is simply not the case. Irrespective of the technology used to publish the content, content licenses still apply to that content and use of the content should be moderated accordingly.

    2 months on
  • Using LinkedIn could get you sued for breach of your restraint of trade agreement

    A case, TEKsystems, Inc. v Hammernick et al, filed in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota could signify a new trend in unlawful competition litigation in South Africa. The case involves a former TEKsystems, Inc. employee who was bound by non-solicitation provisions in her employment agreement with TEKsystems and who then contacted a number of people she was prohibited from contacting after her employment with TEKsystems came to an end. The interesting aspect of this case is that she contacted these individuals through LinkedIn, a very popular business networking and, increasingly, recruitment tool.

    According to an article about the case by Renee M. Jackson at Nixon Peabody:

    Brelyn Hammernick worked as a recruiter for TEKsystems, and signed a non-competition, non-solicitation, and non-disclosure agreement with TEKsystems. Hammernick’s employment agreement provided that, for a period of eighteen months following termination of her employment, she was prohibited from directly or indirectly approaching, contacting, soliciting, or inducing any person who had been a “Contract Employee” during the two-year period prior to the date of her termination and about whom she knew of by reason of her employment with TEKsystems, to: cease working for TEKsystems at clients or customers of TEKsystems, refrain from beginning work for TEKsystems at clients or customers of TEKsystems, or provide services to any individual, corporation, or entity whose business is competitive with TEKsystems. Importantly, these restrictive covenants in Hammernick’s employment agreement did not reference competition, solicitation, or disclosure via social media specifically.

    The definition of “Contract Employee” in the employment agreement covers those IT professionals that Hammernick recruited and then placed on a contract basis with TEKsystems’ clients and customers, but who remain employed by TEKsystems.

    When Hammernick’s employment with TEKsystems ended, she went to work for Horizontal Integration, Inc., also an IT staffing firm. The complaint alleges that, after her employment with TEKsystems ended, Hammernick unlawfully communicated, on behalf of Horizontal Integration, with at least twenty “Contract Employees” via LinkedIn, the premiere social networking website used for business and professional purposes.

    The cause of action in this case is not new to South African law. South African employees are frequently bound by non-solicitation provisions contained in their employment agreements. Typically former employees fall foul of these provisions when they leave employment and attempt to solicit current employees to leave their employment and join those former employees at a competitor.

    What is novel about the TEKsystems case and future, similar cases in South Africa is that the former employee, in this case Hammernick, allegedly solicited TEKsystems employees using LinkedIn. While the act of soliciting employees by sending a message over LinkedIn isn't, in itself, novel (it could just as well as been direct email, sms or instant messaging), the fact that it was over LinkedIn adds a dimension to the case. LinkedIn's purpose is to connect people for business purposes. Regardless of the content of the message Hammernick allegedly sent to TEKsystem's Contract Employees, using LinkedIn to send the messages seems to be a pretty compelling indication of her intent to enter into a business relationship with them while at her new employer and TEKsystems competitor.

    LinkedIn profile.png

    Sending a message to employees may be a pretty clear breach of non-solicitation provisions but the case also raises an even more interesting and, potentially, troubling question: does the mere fact that you are connected to a person on a site like LinkedIn imply solicitation? Put another way: given LinkedIn's purpose as a business connector, would a former employee immediately be in breach of his or her non-solicitation undertakings if he/she remained connected to employees at the former employer on LinkedIn? This seems to me to be going too far but it remains to be seen how a court would interpret a connection on LinkedIn in this context? Finding that these connections create a presumption of a breach could mean that former employees would be required to terminate their connections to their former colleagues when they leave their employer. Such a finding would also have some disturbing privacy implications because a court would be interfering in personal relationships which may also be professional without any real evidence of improper conduct.

    What is clear from this case is that local employers should consider the implications of connections across social networks when they frame their employees' contracts and their restraint and non-solicitation provisions in particular. These provisions should cater for these sorts of connections as well as privacy and similar sensitivities.

    2 months on
  • Using LinkedIn could get you sued for breach of your restraint of trade agreement

    A case, TEKsystems, Inc. v Hammernick et al, filed in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota could signify a new trend in unlawful competition litigation in South Africa. The case involves a former TEKsystems, Inc. employee who was bound by non-solicitation provisions in her employment agreement with TEKsystems and who then contacted a number of people she was prohibited from contacting after her employment with TEKsystems came to an end. The interesting aspect of this case is that she contacted these individuals through LinkedIn, a very popular business networking and, increasingly, recruitment tool.

    According to an article about the case by Renee M. Jackson at Nixon Peabody:

    Brelyn Hammernick worked as a recruiter for TEKsystems, and signed a non-competition, non-solicitation, and non-disclosure agreement with TEKsystems. Hammernick’s employment agreement provided that, for a period of eighteen months following termination of her employment, she was prohibited from directly or indirectly approaching, contacting, soliciting, or inducing any person who had been a “Contract Employee” during the two-year period prior to the date of her termination and about whom she knew of by reason of her employment with TEKsystems, to: cease working for TEKsystems at clients or customers of TEKsystems, refrain from beginning work for TEKsystems at clients or customers of TEKsystems, or provide services to any individual, corporation, or entity whose business is competitive with TEKsystems. Importantly, these restrictive covenants in Hammernick’s employment agreement did not reference competition, solicitation, or disclosure via social media specifically.

    The definition of “Contract Employee” in the employment agreement covers those IT professionals that Hammernick recruited and then placed on a contract basis with TEKsystems’ clients and customers, but who remain employed by TEKsystems.

    When Hammernick’s employment with TEKsystems ended, she went to work for Horizontal Integration, Inc., also an IT staffing firm. The complaint alleges that, after her employment with TEKsystems ended, Hammernick unlawfully communicated, on behalf of Horizontal Integration, with at least twenty “Contract Employees” via LinkedIn, the premiere social networking website used for business and professional purposes.

    The cause of action in this case is not new to South African law. South African employees are frequently bound by non-solicitation provisions contained in their employment agreements. Typically former employees fall foul of these provisions when they leave employment and attempt to solicit current employees to leave their employment and join those former employees at a competitor.

    What is novel about the TEKsystems case and future, similar cases in South Africa is that the former employee, in this case Hammernick, allegedly solicited TEKsystems employees using LinkedIn. While the act of soliciting employees by sending a message over LinkedIn isn't, in itself, novel (it could just as well as been direct email, sms or instant messaging), the fact that it was over LinkedIn adds a dimension to the case. LinkedIn's purpose is to connect people for business purposes. Regardless of the content of the message Hammernick allegedly sent to TEKsystem's Contract Employees, using LinkedIn to send the messages seems to be a pretty compelling indication of her intent to enter into a business relationship with them while at her new employer and TEKsystems competitor.

    LinkedIn profile.png

    Sending a message to employees may be a pretty clear breach of non-solicitation provisions but the case also raises an even more interesting and, potentially, troubling question: does the mere fact that you are connected to a person on a site like LinkedIn imply solicitation? Put another way: given LinkedIn's purpose as a business connector, would a former employee immediately be in breach of his or her non-solicitation undertakings if he/she remained connected to employees at the former employer on LinkedIn? This seems to me to be going too far but it remains to be seen how a court would interpret a connection on LinkedIn in this context? Finding that these connections create a presumption of a breach could mean that former employees would be required to terminate their connections to their former colleagues when they leave their employer. Such a finding would also have some disturbing privacy implications because a court would be interfering in personal relationships which may also be professional without any real evidence of improper conduct.

    What is clear from this case is that local employers should consider the implications of connections across social networks when they frame their employees' contracts and their restraint and non-solicitation provisions in particular. These provisions should cater for these sorts of connections as well as privacy and similar sensitivities.

    2 months on
  • A new Companies Act - We all fall down

    This is part 8 of a series of posts about the new Companies Act. You can read the first three parts and other posts about South African corporate law right here.

    Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the New Companies Act relates to the introduction of certain provisions relating to the assistance of financially distressed companies.
    Every economy shows business successes and failures. A business may fail for a variety of reasons, and not just because of poor management. This is completely normal. The difficulty faced when a company fails is the ripple effect it has on its employees, suppliers and creditors.

    For some time the international community has been leaning away from the liquidation of companies in financial distress to a business rescue type process, whereby the company is essentially given a second chance.

    It terms of section 128(1) of the New Companies Act the objective of the business rescue process is to facilitate the rehabilitation of a financially distressed company by providing for the supervision and management of a company (on a temporary basis), placing a moratorium on the rights of claimants against the company or in respect of its property and the development and implementation of business rescue plan, or if that is not possible, to achieve a better return for the company’s creditors than if the company had been liquidated at the outset.

    A company is considered to be financially distressed when:

    • there is reason to believe that the company will not be in a position to pay all of its debts as and when they become due and payable over the next six months; and
    • it is likely that the company will be insolvent within the next six months.

    Business rescue procedures may be commenced either by a resolution of the directors of the company or by court order. For obvious reasons the directors will only be in a position to take such a resolution and there appears to be a reasonable prospect of rescuing the company. If there were no such reasonable grounds and no business rescue practitioner has been appointed, the resolution may be set aside by order of court.

    So what does that mean?

    A business rescue practitioner is appointed to the company and will assume the full management function of the company. He may remove directors if he feels this is necessary and he may delegate certain of his functions to the remaining directorate and management. Once the business rescue practitioner has had an opportunity to investigate the affairs of the company, he must develop a business rescue plan, and if adopted, oversee the implementation thereof.
    For as long as the corporate rescue proceedings are ongoing, a moratorium is placed on most civil proceedings and additional proceedings may be started only with the permission of the business rescue practitioner. The court time periods or enforcement periods do not apply against the company during the business rescue.

    The property of the company is protected in that it may only dispose thereof in the ordinary course of their business, as part of an approved rescue plan or with the specific consent of the business rescue practitioner.

    The assets of the company may be used as security for funding required during the business rescue period. Employees are on the top of the pecking order for payment of their salaries as their contracts are not effected by the business rescue proceedings and any retrenchment process which is undertaken will still be governed by the relevant labour legislation.

    What happens to creditors?

    The creditors are entitled to be notified of and participate in all elements of the business rescue process and play a crucial roll in the approval (or rejection) of the business rescue plan.

    Whenever there is a decision which requires the input of the creditors, each creditor will be entitled to the a vote equal to the value of his claim against the company. In order to facilitate this process, the creditors may form a committee to represent their interests and allow them to prove their claims against the company.

    What is a business rescue plan?

    As the name implies it is a roadmap on how to potentially save the company from liquidation and set it back on the path of financial success. In order to be effective the business rescue plan must contain all of the information that any person affected by the business rescue would need in order to determine whether the business rescue plan should be accepted.

    The plan itself is divided into three sections: an introduction and background, proposals, assumptions and conditions and a certificate which must be provided by the business rescue practitioner.

    The plan must contain a list of all of the assets and liabilities of the company together with all security provided by the company. In the event that the company may ultimately be liquidated, versus the potential benefits of approving the business rescue plan must also be disclosed.

    The bulk of the business rescue plan will be devoted to proposals on how to assist the company and must detail any moratoria imposed, how the company will be released from certain of its debts. In this regard it should be borne in mind that the business rescue practitioner may cancel or suspend, whether in whole or in part almost any agreement that the company has entered into. This entitlement depending on how it is utilised may have severely negative consequences on the creditors.

    Unless a court dictates otherwise, the business rescue plan mist be completed within 25 business days after the resolution or court order is granted.

    If the creditors accept the business rescue plan then they are all bound by it and the business rescue practitioner must then take all the necessary steps to implement the business rescue plan.

    It is intended that all business rescue procedures must be undertaken within 3 months. The business rescue practitioner may apply for additional time from the court and the business rescue practitioner must deliver monthly reports on the progress of the proceedings to all affected persons, the court or to the Commission until the business rescue proceedings are terminated.

    Compromises

    Much like its predecessor, the New Companies Act contains a mechanism to enter into a compromise with its creditors or a scheme of arrangement (as discussed previously). The primary difference is that the court is no longer an active participant in the process, but merely sanctions the compromise once the parties thereto have reached an agreement on the terms thereof.

    In terms of section 155(1) of the New Companies Act, the provisions relating to compromises do not apply to a company undergoing business rescue procedures.

    The remaining provisions largely fall in line with the Old Companies Act and will not be discussed in any detail, save to state that the proposal which must be approved by all affected parties by means of a special resolution, which once obtained must be submitted to the High Court for sanction, provided that it is just and equitable for the court to do so.

    2 months on
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